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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
AUTOMOBILES--INJuRIES FROM OPERATION, OR USE OF HIGHWAY-
WHETHER OR NOT OWNER OP PARKED AUTOMOBILE WHO LEAVES KEY IN
IGNITION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INJURIES INFLICTED BY THIEF WHO STEALS
CAR-Judicial speculation on the purpose and intent of the legislature
when enacting Section 189(a) of the Motor Vehicle Act became apparent
in the case of Ostergard v. Frisch,' a case of far-reaching importance to
car owners in Illinois. The defendant automobile owner there concerned
1333 Il. App. 359, 77 N. E. (2d) 537 (1948). Niemeyer, P. J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
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left his car standing unattended on a Chicago street with the motor off
but with the key left in the ignition, thereby violating the statute afore-
mentioned. 2 A thief drove off with the car, collided with and damaged
plaintiff's parked automobile, and the Municipal Court of Chicago, sitting
without a jury, rendered judgment against the defendant for the damage
done. That judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First
District, despite a dissenting opinion, on the ground that, in determining
whether the negligence involved in a violation of the statute was the
proximate cause of the resulting injury, the statute might, by its obvious
intent, "enlarge upon the general definition of proximate cause."3
Through the years, the courts have been called upon to decide the
broad general question of whether a violation of a statute should serve to
impose civil liability,4 but the law on this subject is in a state of uncer-
tainty and the decisions are no models either of logic or consistency.
One group of cases holds that every violation of a statute is negligence
per se but that whether or not such negligence is the proximate cause of
the injury should be a jury question. 5 Another group of cases, agreeing
that a violation of a statute is negligence per se, nevertheless holds that,
as a matter of law, the intervening act of an intermeddler, not the original
negligence of the party violating the statute, is to be regarded as the
proximate cause of any subsequent injury." On the specific point, the
increase in recent years of statutes and ordinances requiring that cars
left standing unattended on public streets should be locked has come to
be an important factor. Several states have statutes identical with or
2111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95 , §§ 189(a) and 118.
3 333 Ill. App. 359 at 369, 77 N. E. (2d) 537 at 541. The minority opinion ad-
hered to the time-honored rule of law that the causal connection between a per-
son's negligence and an injury is broken by the intervention of a willful, malicious
and criminal act of a third person, unless there are special circumstances which
will render the defendant liable on the theory that the intervening cause was
reasonably foreseeable.
4 Atkinson v. The Newcastle and Gateshead Waterworks Co., L. R. 2 Exch. Div.
441 (1877) and L. R. 6 Ex. 404 (1878) ; Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & Bl. 402, 118 Eng.
Rep. 1193 (1854).
5 Moran v. Borden Co., 309 Ill. App. 391, 33 N. E. (2d) 166 (1941) ; Malloy v.
Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N. E. (2d) 1001 (1941) ; Garis v. Eberling, 18 Tenn.
App. 1, 71 S. W. (2d) 215 (1934). But see contra, Galbraith v. Levin, - Mass. -,
81 N. E. (2d) 560 (1948).
6 Squires v. Brooks, 44 App. D. C. 320 (1916), overruled by Ross v. Hartman,
78 App. D. C. 217, 139 F. (2d) 14 (1943) ; Galbraith v. Levin, - Mass. -, 81 N. E.
(2d) 560 (1948); Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N. E. (2d) 330 (1945);
Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N. E. 778 (1927) ; Roberts v. Lundy,
301 Mich. 726, 4 N. W. (2d) 74 (1942); Kennedy v. Hedberg, 159 Minn. 76,
198 N. W. 302 (1924) ; Rhad v. Duquesne Light Co., 255 Pa. 409, 100 A. 262 (1917).
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very similar to the Illinois provision construed in the instant case 7 and,
where these statutes have been involved, some decisions to date line up
with the minority holding therein8 but there has been a strong tendency
to hold as did the majority of the court.9
In situations of this kind, three fundamental inquiries immediately
arise, namely: (1) did the defendant violate the statute; (2) what were
the facts concerning the plaintiff's injury; and (3) was plaintiff's injury
of the type which the statute was intended to prevent? The first two are
fact questions, but the third generates a question of law which embraces
and, in effect, actually eliminates the troublesome and confusing considera-
tion of proximate causation.' 0 It necessarily requires a construction of the
statute, which may be construed as if it were intended to protect all
persons or as if designed to protect a particular class of persons against
a more or less narrowly restricted type of hazard. If the former, the
violator is more or less automatically liable upon a showing of violation.
Under the latter view, the offender cannot be civilly liable unless the
injury which results to the other is caused by his exposure to the particu-
lar hazard from which it was the design of the statute to protect him."
Canons of construction require that a statute should be interpreted with
reference to the principles of common law in force at the time of its
passage and, to arrive at sound interpretation, the search should be guided
by four cardinal points of orientation, to-wit: (1) what was the common
law before the passage of the act; (2) what was the hazard against which
the common law did not provide; (3) what remedy did the legislature
intend to provide to cure the hazard; and (4) what was the true purpose
of the law? 12
As to the first of these, it was not unlawful at common law to park a
car unattended, to leave the key in the ignition, to keep the motor running,
or to fail to set the brakes and turn the wheels to the curb when on a
7 Colo. Stats. 1935, Ch. 16, § 232; Burns' Ind. Stats. Ann., Vol. 8, p. 879, § 47-2124;
Kans. Rev. Stats. 1942, § 189.430; Md. Code 1943, Art. 66%, § 192; Mass. Gen.
Laws 1932, Ch. 90, §§ 7 and 13; Miss. Stats., § 8219; N. H. Rev. Laws 1942, Ch.
119, § 24; R. I. Gen. Laws, Ch. 88, § 15; Utah Code Ann. 1942, Tit. 57, Ch. 7, § 169;
Wyo. Rev. Stats. 1945, Ch. 60, § 530. See also D. of C. Traffic Reg., § 58.
8 Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N. E. (2d) 330 (1945); Slater v. T. C.
Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N. E. 778 (1927).
9 Ross v. Hartman, 78 App. D. C. 217, 139 F. (2d) 14 (1943), cert. den. 321
U. S. 790, 64 S. Ct. 790, 88 L. Ed. 1080 (1943), reversing Squires v. Brooks, 44
App. D. C. 320 (1916). See also Bullock v. Dahlstrom, 46 A. (2d) 370 (D. C.,
1946).
10 Venable, "Proximate Causes and Effects," 19 Miss. L. J. 183 (1948) ; Lowndes,
"Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation," 16 Minn. L. Rev. 361 (1932).
"Restatement, Torts, § 286(h).
12 Potter's Dwaris on Statutes (1871), p. 184.
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perceptible grade. Any of these things might or might not have been
regarded as actionable negligence, depending upon how a jury decided
the question of proximate causation, but they were not negligent acts as a
matter of law nor were they offenses against the state. A motor vehicle
was not regarded as a dangerous instrumentality but more nearly analogous
to a horse and wagon, 13 so the operator was under a duty to exercise only
such care as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the
circumstances. 1 4 Leaving a car or horse unattended, unlocked or un-
fastened on a public street was not ipso facto negligence15 although, with
added circumstances, it might be so considered 16 particularly if a prudent
man would have reasonably foreseen that injury might result.
What, then, was the hazard against which the common law did not
provide? Clearly it failed to provide adequate measures to lessen the
danger to the public from runaway horses or runaway cars in those cases
where no fault attended upon the leaving thereof unguarded. By declar-
ing it to be a misdemeanor to park a car with the motor running, or with
the key in the ignition, or without bracing the wheels on a hill, the state
could, under its police power, materially lessen the hazard to the public
from runaway cars, without at the same time increasing the car owner's
civil responsibilities on common law principles. 1 7 The common law already
provided sufficient protection against the hazard of having a parked car
set in motion by the intervention of children, for the courts were ready
to hold the car owner liable where the intervening efficient cause of the
injury was such as he could reasonably have anticipated.18 But, to be
reasonably foreseeable, the act of the intermeddler should be a normal
response to the situation created by the defendant's negligence. Theft of
a parked automobile, made easy because the key is in the ignition, is not a
normal response but is, rather, the willful, malicious or criminal act of
13 Maloney v. Kaplan, 233 N. Y. 426, 135 N. E. 838 (1922); Vincent v. Crandall
& Godley Co., 115 N. Y. S. 600 (1909).
14 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles, § 338.
15 Castay v. Katz & Bestoff, 148 So. 76 (La. App. 1933); Roberts v. Lundy,
301 Mich. 726, 4 N. W. (2d) 74 (1942); Jackson v. Mills-Fox Baking Co., 221
Mich. 64, 190 N. W. 740, 26 A. L. R. 906 (1922) ; Wilson v. Harrington, 269 App.
Div. 891, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 157 (1945), affirmed in 295 N. Y. 667, 65 N. E. (2d)
101 (1946); Walter v. Bond, 267 App. Div. 779, 45 N. Y. S. (2d) 379 (1943);
Kaplan v. Shults Bread Co., 208 N. Y. S. 118 (1925) ; Maloney v. Kaplan, 233
N. Y. 426, 135 N. E. 838 (1922) ; Frashella v. Taylor, 157 N. Y. S. 881 (1916);
Rapczynski v. W. T. Cowan, Inc., 138 Pa. Super. 392, 10 A. (2d) 810 (1940).
16 Tomano v. Ideal Towel Supply Co., - N. J. -, 51 A. (2d) 888 (1947);
Connell v. Berland, 223 App. Div. 234, 228 N. Y. S. 20 (1928) ; Gumbrell v. Clausen
Flanagan Brewery, 199 App. Div. 778, 192 N. Y. S. 451 (1922) ; Campbell v. Model
Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925).
17 Thayer, "Public Wrong and Private Action," 27 Harv. L. Rev. 317 (1914).
18 Neering v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 383 Ill. 381, 50 N. E. (2d) 497 (1943). The
case of Moran v. Borden Co., 309 Ill. App. 391, 33 N. E. (2d) 166 (1941), could
well be said to rest on common law doctrines.
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anvther for which the common law relieved the party guilty of mere
passive negligence from liability. That fact, then, might have been within
the cognizance of the legislature when it acted. But is it not more reason-
able to suppose it was the first defect at which the statute was aimed
rather than the second, i.e. the hazard of a parked car being stolen and
driven negligently by the thief? To read into the statute a presumption
that the owner impliedly consented to the use of his car by a thief or other
unauthorized person would be clearly unconstitutional, even if the courts
should be permitted to so liberally construe a statute in derogation of the
common law when no such intent is to be found in its language.
What remedy did the legislature provide designed to cure the hazard?
The provision in question is part of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic
on Highways. 19 The whole act was designed to regulate traffic and the
language thereof is free from ambiguity. Under the general purpose of
regulating traffic in the interest of public safety, and for the obvious
specific purpose of lessening the danger that parked cars might be set in
motion without the intervention of human agency, the legislature, pur-
suant to its police power, set out such precautions as would guard against
runaway cars. The engine should be stopped because a shove from some
direction might start the vehicle up under its own power. The ignition
should be locked and the key removed because a shove might move the
key, unlock the ignition and start the car. The brakes should be set and
the wheels turned to the curb when parking on a grade, because the force
of gravity or a shove might start the driverless car on a terror-laden frolic
of its own. To lessen these dangers, the legislature ordered that drivers
should abide by the regulations set forth, under penalty of being guilty
of a misdemeanor. Just that, and nothing more, can be found in the
words of the legislative command.
What, then, was the true purpose of the statute? Simply stated, it
was to regulate traffic. If the purpose had been to prevent theft, the
statute would have required, in addition, that the car doors be locked and
all windows be shut tight. Provision for the setting of brakes would then
have been entirely out of place. It therefore seems clear, without the need
for unnecessary speculation, that the purpose of Section 189 (a) was merely
to prevent injuries apt to be caused by runaway cars. If the statute had
been construed and applied as it would seem to have been intended, that
is to protect the public against a narrowly restricted type of hazard, the
defendant in the instant case would not have been held civilly liable for
his violation thereof. To hold otherwise exposes the majority of the court
to the charge of making an nnjust enlargement upon both the legislative
language and purpose.
GRAcE THOMAS STRIPLING
19 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95 %, § 98 et seq.
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AUTOMOBILES-INJURIES FROM OPERATION, OR USE OF HIGHWAYS-
WHETHER SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF PROCESS AGAINST NONRESIDENT AUTOIST
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO ACTIONS BASED ON ACCIDENTS OCCURRING ON PUBLIC
HIGHWAYS--In the recent case of 0'Sullivan v. Brown,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was confronted with the problem of
determining whether or not the nonresident motorist statute of Texas2
was applicable to an accident which occurred on a road within premises
owned by the United States Government but leased by it to a manufactur-
ing corporation to be used as an airplane plant. The defendant was a
resident of Illinois and service of process was had upon him in the
statutory fashion. Defendant moved to quash the service and to dismiss
the action on the ground of want of jurisdiction, contending that the
road upon which the accident occurred was not a public highway within
the meaning of that term as used in the statute. It was shown that the
premises were entirely surrounded by a fence, that ingress and egress to
and from the premises could be had only through gates provided for that
purpose, and that admission to the premises could be had only upon secur-
ing a proper permit from the company's representative or from United
States Army personnel in charge. Once inside the premises, the individual
came under the control and jurisdiction of the United States Army. The
trial court overruled the motion and, after trial, judgment was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the
ground that the locus of the accident did not fall within the statute. The
court indicated that the controlling factor, in determining the meaning of
the term "public highway," was whether the public had the right, gen-
erally, to use the road. If, as of right, the use of the road was open to the
public, then it was a "public highway." If, on the other hand, the use of
the road could be inhibited by any private person, then the road was not
public, no matter what the facts were regarding its prior use by the public,
the volume of that usage, the state of maintenance or of police juris-
diction. The court was not unaware of the fact that the result reached
was not entirely satisfactory for it said, after noting that other courts
which have dealt with the problem have strictly construed statutes of the
kind in question, that a "strict construction seems unfortunate, for it
1177 F. (2d) 199 (1948).
2 Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stats. Ann., Vol. 5, Tit. 42, Art. 20301a, §1. The pertinent
parts thereof are as follows: "The acceptance by a nonresident • . . of the rights,
privileges and benefits of the public highways or public streets of this state ...
shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such ponresident... of the Chair-
man of the State Highway Commission . . . to be his true and lawful attorney and
agent upon whom may be served all lawful process in any civil action . . . growing
out of any accident or collision in which said nonresident . . . may be involved
while operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle on such public highway or public
street. . . ." Italics added.
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may disregard the true intent of the lawmakers as well as the public
policy which prompted the enactments and may operate to defeat the
purpose for which the statutes were enacted. "3
The seeming inequity in the result and the cogency of the observation
made by the judge raises a problem of legislative intent and makes
appropriate an inquiry into the language used in the various nonresident
motorist statutes to ascertain if a distinction between accidents occurring
on public property in contrast to those occurring on private property is
warranted. The principal factors motivating the enactment of statutes
of this nature lie in a recognition of the capability of the negligently
operated vehicle to inflict harm; the ease with which the nonresident tort
feasor may remove himself from the state in which the harm was
inflicted, thereby escaping personal service of process with its consequent
judicial accountability in that state; as well as the burden and handicap
thrust on the resident whose only redress is to pursue the nonresident to
the state of his domicile and there institute action.4 At the outset, then,
it would seem arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable to distinguish
between accidents occurring on private property and those occurring on
public land. To do so is to lose sight of evils sought, in the first instance,
to be rectified. Certainly, the danger of the vehicle is not mitigated by
virtue of its operation on private property. The resident is no less harmed,
while the disadvantage to which he is put, if he would have redress, is
the same.
The answer, then, lies in the language of the statutes themselves.
All of the forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have nonresident
motorist statutes. Common to all of them, are the so-called "agency"
clause and the "coverage" clause. The former is, of course, that part of
the statute under which some designated state officer becomes the agent
of the nonresident; the latter denotes the loci which are intended to be
covered. Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia create the
agency by virtue of the nonresident's use and operation of a motor vehicle
on a public highway and would, seemingly, limit the agency to accidents
occurring on the "public highway" for the limiting term "public high-
way" appears in both clauses.- A second group of statutes, found in
3 177 F. (2d) 199 at 202.
4 See Scott, "Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists," 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563-86
(1926) ; Culp, "Process in Actions Against Non-resident Motorists," 32 Mich. L.
Rev. 325-50 (1934) ; Culp, "Recent Developments in Actions Against Non-resident
Motorists," 37 Mich. L. Rev. 58-77 (1938).
5 D. C. Code 1940, Tit. 40, § 403; Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 7, § 199; Ariz. Code Ann.
1939, Ch. 66, § 227; Ark. Stat. Ann. 1947, Vol. 3, Ch. 27, § 341; Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935,
Vol. 2, Ch. 16, § 48(1) ; Conn. Stat. 1930, Tit. 58, Ch. 288, § 5475; Del. Laws 1935,
Ch. 225, § 1; Ga. Laws 1937, Part 1, Tit. 6, No. 444, at p. 732; Iowa Code 1946,
Vol. 1, Ch. 321, § 321.498; Burns Ind. Stat. 1933, Vol. 8, Ch. 10 § 47-1043; La Dart
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thirteen states, while in other respects not dissimilar from the first group,
are distinguishable because of the omission of the word "public" in both
the agency and coverage clauses." The basic situation would seem to be
broadened under these statutes unless the term "highway" is given a
narrow definition.
The statutes of Kansas7 and of New Mexico' are also generally similar
but with one important distinction. The agency is there created by the
use of the "public highway" but thereafter the nonresident becomes
amenable to service of process under the statute for "any accident or
collision in which said motor vehicle may be involved" while it is being
operated in the state. The coverage clause is there clearly intended to
be far broader. The statutes of Tennessee9 and of New Hampshire0 also
present variations for in these two instances the agency is created by the
use of "highways" and "ways" respectively, but thereafter coverage is
extended to any accident "in this state," in the words of the Tennessee
statute, or to any accident occurring "on such ways, or elsewhere," in
the words of the New Hampshire statute. The latter, by the insertion of
the words "or elsewhere," seems pointedly to have provided against any
strict construction based on distinctions between public or private property.
The fifth and last group of statutes would appear to be best suited to
cure the evils at which these statutes were aimed for, in seven states,"
the mere operation of a motor vehicle in the state creates the agency and
Civ. Code 1939, Vol. 4, Ch. 4, § 5296; Me. Rev. Stat. 1944, Vol. 1, Oh. 19, § 59;
Flack Md. Ann. Code, 1947 cumin. supp., Art. 56, § 106; Mass. Ann. Laws 1933, Vol.
3, Ch. 90, § 3a; Mich. Stat. Ann., Vol. 8, Tit. 9, Ch. 74, § 9.1701; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
1939, Vol. 18, Ch. 45, Art. 1, § 8410.1; Miss. Code Ann. 1942, Tit. 37, Ch. 4, § 9363;
Nev. Comp. Laws, 1941 supp., Vol. 1, § 4441.01; N. C. Gen. Stats. 1943, Vol. 1, Ch. 1,
§ 1-105; Okla. Stat. Ann. (perm. ed.,) Tit. 47, Ch. 11, § 391; R. I. Gen. Laws 1938,
Ch. 103, § 1; S. C. Code 1942, Vol. 1, Tit. 7, Ch. 16, § 437; Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stat.
Ann., Vol. 5, Tit. 42, Art. 2039a; Remington's Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1937, Vol. 7a,
Tit. 41, § 6360-129; W. Va. Code Ann. 1943, Ch. 56, § 5555 (1).
6 Cal. Deering Vehicle Code Ann. 1944, Ch. 1, § 404; Ida. Code 1947, Vol. 9, Tit.
49, Ch. 12, § 1202; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95 2, § 23; Minn. Stat. Ann. 1945, Vol. 12,
Ch. 170, § 170.55; Mont. Rev. Code 1935, Vol. 1, Ch. 152, § 1760.12; Neb. Rev. Stat.
1943, Vol. 2, Ch. 25, § 530; N. D. Rev. Code 1943, Vol. 3, Ch. 28, § 0611; Ore. Comp.
Laws Ann. 1940, Vol. g, Tit. 115, Ch. 1, Art. 5, § 128B; S. D. Code 1939, Vol. 2,
Ch. 33, § 33.0809; Utah Code Ann. 1943, Vol. 3, Tit. 37, Ch. 13, § 12; Va. Code Ann.
1942, Tit. 18, Ch. 90b, Art. 1, §2154(70) (1) ; Wis. Stats. 1945, Ch. 85, § 85.05(3)
Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1945, Vol. 4, Ch. 60, § 60-1101.
7 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. 1935, Ch. 8, Art. 4, § 8-401.
8 N. M. Stat. Ann. 1941, Vol. 5, Ch. 68, Art 10, § 68-1003.
9 Williams' Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, Vol. 6, Tit. 1, Ch. 5, Art. 4, § 8671.
10 N. H. Rev. Laws 1942, Vol. 1, Tit. IX, Ch. 116, § 42.
11 Fla. Stat. 1941, Tit. 6, Ch. 47, §§ 47.29-47.30; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1948, Ch. 188,
§ 188.030; N. 3. Stat. Ann., Tit. 2, Ch. 32, § 2:32-34.1; McKinney's New York Consol.
Laws Ann., Vol. 62A, Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 52; Page, Ohio Gen. Code Ann.,
Vol. 4a, Ch. 21, § 6308-1; Purdon's Penn. Stat. Ann. (perm. ed.,), Tit. 75, Ch. 4,
§ 1201; Vt. Stats., 1947 revision, Tit. 46, Ch. 428, § 10062.
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thereafter the nonresident becomes amenable to the process of that state
for "any accidents" in which such nonresident is involved while operating
the motor vehicle "within the state." No attempt is there made to restrict
the locus, so any distinction based on public or private property would
seem to be unwarranted.
The question of locus of the accident, within the meaning of these
statutes, has arisen but few times. For the most part, the courts have
felt themselves bound by the principle that the statutes, being in derogation
of the common law, must be strictly construed. 12  In three cases,' 3 the
courts have even felt that the statutes could not constitutionally apply
to accidents, the causative force of which did not arise from the use of
the highways. The result has been harshness and seeming inequity to the
injured plaintiff, but in most instances the result has been proper in the
light of the statute which the court had to construe. Thus, in those states
which require both the use of the public highway and the occurrence of
an accident thereon to enable the resident to avail himself of the statutory
benefit, the fact that the accident has occurred on a private driveway,",
on the grounds of a filling station," on the grounds of a World's Fair,18
in a privately owned public garage,17 and on the parking lot of a night
club,'8 has been held to bar the resident from obtaining service of process
on the nonresident through the statute. The Supreme Court of Louisiana,
however, interpreting a statute similar in language to those under which
the results just noted were obtained, reached a different conclusion in
the case of Galloway v. Wyatt Metal & Boiler Works.'9 The court there
held that a road which was privately owned but was publicly used
constituted a "public" highway within the meaning of the Louisiana
statute. While the result is admirable and in accord with the fundamental
purpose of these statutes, the reasoning therein, in the light of the
statute, is not beyond reproach.
12Kelley v. Koetting, 164 Kan. 542, 190 P. (2d) 361 (1948) ; Jermaine v. Graf,
235 Iowa 1063, 283 N. W. 428 (1939) ; Kerr v. Greenstein, 213 Ark. 447, 212 S. W.(2d) 1 (1948) ; Mull v. Taylor, 68 Ga. App. 663, 23 S. E. (2d) 595 (1943) ; Kornfleld
v. Hurwitz, 178 Misc. 216, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 820 (1942); Flynn v. Kramer, 271
Mich. 500, 261 N. W. 77 (1935).
13 Finn v. Schreiber, 35 F. Supp. (1940); Brauer Machine & Supply Co. v.
Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569, 50 N. E. (2d) 836 (1943); Kelley v. Koetting,
164 Kan. 542, 190 P. (2d) 361 (1948).
14 Dworkin v. Spector Motor Service, Inc., 3 F. R. D. 340 (1944) ; Zielinski v.
Lyford, 175 Misc. 517, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 489 (1940).
15 Finn v. Schreiber, 35 F. Supp. 638 (1940).
16 Catalano v. Maddox, 175 Misc. 24, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 149 (1940).
17 Haughey v. Minneola Garage, Inc., 174 Misc. 332, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 857 (1940).
Is Harris v. Hanson, 75 F. Supp. 481 (1948).
19 189 La. 837, 181 So. 187 (1938).
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It is interesting to note that New York, which at one time belonged
in the category of states first mentioned, amended its statute in 1942 so
as to eliminate any reference to "public" highways. The mere operation
of a motor vehicle in that state now serves to create the agency, and the
nonresident is thereafter amenable to service of process for any accident
in which he may be involved while so operating the motor vehicle. The
New York cases noted above2" all stemmed from causes of action arising
prior to the effective date of the amendment and may have been the cause
of the same. No case bearing on the precise point has been decided in
that state since then21 but it would seem that, by the amendment, the
legislature intended to destroy the arbitrary distinction theretofore
existing between public and private property which produced the results
already observed.
Illinois has likewise had occasion to consider the question. In the
case of Brauer Machine & Supply Company v. Parkhill Truck Company,22
the decision turned on a question of proximate cause, but the court did
indicate by way of dictum that, as long as the causal force of the accident
originated in the use of the highway, it would make no difference where
the harm was inflicted so the statute could apply. Conversely, the court
indicated that if the nonresident statute was intended to apply to accidents
occurring on private property, both as to cause and effect, it would then
be constitutionally objectionable as violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It was reasoning of that character which induced Kansas, a state
with a statute which places no restriction on the locus of the accident so
long as the proper agency is created, to reach a result seemingly dissonant
with the language of its statute. In Kelley v. Koetting," the nonresident
combine operator negligently destroyed a resident's wheat while working
on plaintiff's field with his machine. Despite the all-inclusive language of
the statute, the court, one judge dissenting, held that the statute was
20 See notes 14 to 18 inclusive, ante.
21 More recent cases, such as Cooper v. Amehler, 178 Misc. 844, 35 N. Y. S. (2d)
917 (1942) ; LaPlaca v. Hutcheson, 191 Misc. 27, 79 N. Y. S. (2d) 355 (1948);
Lowe v. Western Express Co., 189 Misc. 177, 68 N. Y. S. (2d) 873 (1947) ; and the
like, all deal with other aspects of the law.
22 383 Ill. 569, 50 N. E. (2d) 836, 148 A. L. R. 1208 (194-3). The accident oc-
curred while the nonresident defendant's truck was being unloaded on private
property after traversing the public highways of the state in order to reach the
place of unloading. The truck was at rest at the time and had been so for some
time prior to the accident. The court held there was no connection between the
use and operation of a motor vehicle on the highways and the accident, the use of
the highway not being the causal force of the accident. For that reason, it was
decided that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant by virtue of service had
pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95Y2, § 23.
23 164 Kan. 542, 190 P. (2d) 361 (1948).
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applicable only where the harm resulted from the negligent operation of
a motor vehicle on the state highway.
The point has not arisen for decision in the courts of New Hampshire
and Tennessee, comprising the fourth group in this statutory classification,
but in a decision entirely consistent with the language of the Pennsylvania
statute, falling in the fifth class, the Supreme Court of that state has
decided that accidents occurring on private property clearly fall within
the compress of the statute.2 4 Just as in the instant case, the accident
there involved occurred on private property. Considering the constitu-
tional issue, the court noted that to hold that state police power in this
regard could not "constitutionally be exercised beyond the highway itself
and encompass within its scope instances where the nonresident, after
having entered the state over state highways, proceeds onto private
property and there causes injury to another, would [be to] create an
unreasonable distinction. 25
If the result in the instant case is unsatisfactory, the fault would
seem to lie in the language of the statute which necessitated the result
rather than in the reasoning of the court. Logically, no other result could
be justified for the inherent limitations of the language employed admit
of no other construction. The choice of language in the Texas statute,
and those similar to it, is unfortunate. To create a distinction between
public and private property insofar as the locus of the accident is con-
cerned, is to lose sight of the harm to be righted, and the capability of
the negligently operated motor vehicle to inflict harm, no matter where
it is driven. New York, where the question has most frequently arisen,
has recognized the invalidity and basic injustice in such a distinction
and has rectified the situation by an appropriate amendment. It is to
be hoped that other states with limited statutes will take cognizance of
the situation.
F. J. LYNCH
24 Sipe v. Moyer, 353 Pa. 75, 44 A. (2d) 263 (1945).
25 353 Pa. 75 at 78, 44 A. (2d) 263 at 264. The constitutional issue raised in Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927), dealt principally
with the issue as to whether the mere use of the highways of a state by a non-
resident could be sufficient, by implication, to constitute his appointment of the
designated state officer as his agent for service of process. The court therein did
not unequivocally state that such agency would be limited to accidents occurring
on a public highway, although it did say that, under the statute before it, the
"implied consent is limited to proceedings growing out of accidents or collisions on
a highway in which the nonresident may be involved." It should be recognized
that this language was spoken of a statute from Massachusetts, then under con-
sideration, which did in fact limit the agency created. The quoted language is
aptly descriptive of the Massachusetts statute, but it is by no means a generalization
on the point. To contend, as has been suggested, that this language was intended
to limit the applicability of statutes of the kind in question to accidents occurring
only on the highways, and to no others, seems unwarranted.
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT-PLEADING--WHETHER OR NOT COERCIVE
COUNTERCLAIM MAY BE INTERPOSED IN DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION-
When Professor Sunderland wrote in 1917 about that modern evolution
in remedial rights designated as the declaratory judgment, he visualized
it as a friendly suit which would put less strain on the business and
personal relations of the parties and lead to less animosities than a suit
for coercive relief.1 He saw, in the action, a cooperative proceeding in
which the courts would operate as "diplomatic" instead of "belligerent"
agencies. When a plaintiff approaches a court acting as such a diplomatic
agency, seeking its advice, a problem may arise as to whether it would be
proper for the court to permit the defendant to change the character of
the litigation and demand a coercive countersuit. In the recent case of
Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company of New York v. Friedley,2 a
federal district court sitting in Iowa decided, for the first time, the ques-
tion whether reformation of a contract might be obtained under a counter-
claim to an action for a declaratory judgment. An agent of the insurance
company there concerned had written a policy of automobile insurance on
the car of the defendant. Since the latter was a minor, the agent caused
the policy to be issued in the name of his mother, representing this to be a
standard practice in the business. When the minor became involved in
an accident, the plaintiff sought a declaration of non-liability under the
policy because of breach of the sole ownership clause. The defendants
unsuccessfully tried to establish that the clause had been waived by the
misrepresentation of the agent. The judge found that there had been a
mutual mistake but likewise held there was no valid reason why reforma-
tion could not be pleaded defensively in a declaratory judgment action and
granted such relief even though the defendants had not specifically re-
quested the same.3
The decision is in harmony with the policy of liberality under which
the federal courts have permitted counterclaims in declaratory actions
whether based on the former 4 or the present federal Declaratory Judgment
1 Sunderland, "A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights-The Declaratory Judg-
ment," 16 Mich. L. Rev. 69 at 76 (1917).
2 79 F. Supp. 978 (1948).
3 Rule 54(c) of the Fed. Rules of Civ. Pro., 28 U. S. C. A. foll. § 723c, directs
that every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party Is entitled even
though no demand therefor appears in the pleadings. Reformation was prayed
for in counterclaims to declaratory actions in Aralac Inc. v. Hat Corp. of America,
166 F. (2d) 286 (1948), and in Tolle v. Struve, 124 Cal. App. 263, 12 P. (2d) 61
(1932), but in each case the court found no ground for reformation hence did
* not pass on the procedural question of the propriety of the counterclaim. In the
.California case mentioned, one involving the validity of certain leases, it was
held proper, however, to render judgment against the plaintiff for rent which had
accrued.
4 28 U. S. C. § 400 was repealed in 1948.
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Act.5 In common actions begun by insurers seeking a declaration as to
their rights and liabilities under policies, counterclaims for the amount
due thereon to the insured or to the beneficiary have been considered
proper.6 Where a life insurance company, for example, sought a declara-
tory judgment to determine whether a policy was in force at the time of
the death of the insured, it was held proper to set aside a purported
release executed under a mutual mistake of law and fact, although the
defendant did not ask for rescission or cancellation of the release. 7 In
actions brought to have the defendant's patent declared invalid, it is.
common to find counterclaims therein for infringement, not only of the
patent sought to be declared invalid' but also of other patents held by
the counter-plaintiff.9 Such counterclaims in patent suits have even
included requests for further relief such as for an injunction and an
accounting. 10 Similarly, in actions for judgments to declare trade-marks
invalid, counterclaims have been upheld for infringement and injunction 1
or for unfair competition.1
2
In view of this weight of precedent, an objection to coercive counter-
claims in declaratory judgment proceedings is now rarely heard under
the federal rules. A litigant bringing a declaratory judgment action in a
5 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201-2.
6 See Merchants Indemnity Corp. of America v. Dana, 8 F. R. D. 32 (1948);
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 43 F. Supp. 870 (1942), reversed
on other grounds in 136 F. (2d) 807 (1943), cert. den. 320 U. S. 768, 64 S. Ct.
80, 88 L. Ed. 459 (1943); Home Ins. Co. v. Trotter, 130 F. (2d) 800 (1942).
7 Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Forcier, 103 F. (2d) 166 (1939), cert. den. 308 U. S.
571, 60 S. Ct. 86, 84 L. Ed. 479 (1939).
8 General Electric Co. v. Refrigeration Patents Corp., 65 F. Supp. 75 (1946);
National Aluminate Corporation v. Permutit Co., 53 F. Supp. 501 (1943), affirmed
in 145 F. (2d) 175 (1944), cert. den. 324 U. S. 864, 65 S. Ct. 912, 89 L. Ed. 1420
(1945) ; Ryan Distributing Corporation v. Caley, 51 F. Supp. 377 (1943), affirmed
In 147 F. (2d) 138 (1945), cert. den. 325 U. S. 859, 65 S. Ct. 1199, 89 L. Ed.
1979 (1945), but counterclaim denied on merits non obstante veredicto; Petersime
Incubator Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co., 135 F. (2d) 580 (1943), cert. den. 320
U. S. 805, 64 S. Ct. 24, 88 L. Ed. 487 (1943); Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp.,
122 F. (2d) 925 (1941), cert. den. 315 U. S. 813. 62 S. Ct. 798, 86 L. Ed. 1211
(1941), rehear. den. 315 U. S. 831, 62 S. Ct. 913, 86 L. Ed. 1224 (1941) ; Myers v.
Beckman, 1 F. R. D. 99 (1940).
9 Randolph Laboratories v. Specialties Development Corp., 82 F. Supp. 316
(1949) ; White v. E. L. Bruce Co., 62 F. Supp. 577 (1945) ; Refractolite Corp. v.
Prismo Holding Corp., 117 F. (2d) 806 (1941) ; Parris-Dunn Corporation v. Fales,
36 F. Supp. 51 (1940).
10 National Aluminate Corporation v. Permutit Co., 53 F. Supp. 501 (1943),
affirmed In 145 F. (2d) 175 (1944), cert. den. 324 U. S. 864, 65 S. Ct. 912, 89 L. Ed.
1420 (1945); Petersime Incubator Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co., 135 F. (2d) 580
(1943), cert. den. 320 U. S. 805, 64 S. Ct. 24, 88 L. Ed. 487 (1943); Refractolite
Corp. v. Prismo Holding Corp., 117 F. (2d) 806 (1941).
11 Swarthmore Classics v. Swarthmore Junior, 81 F. Supp. 917 (1949). In
Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, 134 F. (2d) 429 (1943), the counterclaim was
dismissed on the merits.
12 House of Westmore v. Denney, 151 F. (2d) 261 (1945).
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federal court should realize that he may be placed in a difficult situation.
In a recent case, that of Merchants Indemnity Corporation of New York v.
Dana,13 a liability insurer instituted an action against an employee of its
insured to determine whether he drove an automobile with the permission
of his employer at the time when he became involved in an accident.
Cross-claims were filed therein to recover for injuries and death due to
the negligence of the defendant. The counsel for the plaintiff found him-
self in the anomalous position of opposing the employee of the insured
on the complaint but also forced to defend him against the cross-claimants.
A request for an extension of time as to the cross-claims, until a deter-
mination had been had on the issues of the complaint, was denied in order
to avoid a delay in the expeditious disposal of all the issues.
Turning to the decisions of the state courts, there is a paucity of
specific decisions on the propriety of the use of coercive counterclaims.
The most detailed discussion may be found in the Utah case of Gray v.
Defa.14 The Utah statute made no provision for the use of a counterclaim
nor did it anyway prescribe the procedure to be followed in seeking relief
under the act.15 The trial court's refusal to take evidence on the counter-
claim was held to be error by the Supreme Court of that state which
decided there was no reason to give a narrow construction to the statute
so as to prevent a court from entering the usual legal or equitable coercive
judgment customary on a counterclaim. The Oregon case of Lowe v. Har-
mon'1 is similar in its facts.
In both cases, the cross-defendants based their arguments on the doc-
trine of Brindley v. Meara,'7 an Indiana case in which the Supreme Court
of that state had held that supplementary relief available under a declara-
tory judgment act' s was limited to declaratory relief and did not authorize
the grant of a coercive judgment. Both reasoned that if the relief avail-
able to a plaintiff is limited, the counterclaimant should be in no better
position, but the Utah and Oregon courts rejected the Indiana doctrine
and adopted instead the more liberal view expressed by two of the leading
text writers on the subject.19 The Utah court even went so far as to deny
13 8 F. R. D. 32 (1948).
14 103 Utah 339, 135 P. (2d) 251, 155 A. L. R. 395 (1943). The plaintiff there
sought a declaration that he owned the land in question free from all adverse
claims of the defendants. Defendants counterclaimed for a complete adjudication
of their rights under a contract of sale and leasehold agreement and for dam-
ages.
15 Utah Code 1943, Tit. 104, Ch. 64.
16 167 Ore. 128, 115 P. (2d) 297 (1941).
17 209 Ind. 144, 198 N. E. 301. 101 A. L. R. 682 (1935).
18 Ind. Acts 1927, Ch. 81, p. 209.
19 Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (Banks-Baldwin Pub. Co., Cleveland, 1941),
2d Ed., p. 441; Anderson. Actions for Declaratory Judgments (West Pub. Co., St.
Paul, 1940), p. 573. See also Borchard, "An Indiana Declaratory Judgment,"
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that the declaratory judgment statute set up a new form of action entitled
to special treatment, considering it to be merely a "new form of relief.'' 20
A declaratory judgment proceeding is usually described as sui generis,
being deemed neither strictly legal or equitable. 21 In Liberty Mutual In-
surance Company v. Jones, 22 however, the Missouri Supreme Court empha-
sized that the historical affinity of the action is equitable,23 hence it could
see no procedural reason to refuse a cross-action for affirmative relief.
The court admitted that, by interposition of a demand for an injunction,
the suit was converted into a suit in equity.
Difficulty may be expected where special state statutes regulate the
use of counterclaims in particular types of actions. A New York statute,
for example, once permitted counterclaims in matrimonial actions only
"where an action for divorce, separation or annulment is brought by
husband and wife. "24 In Kiebler v. Kiebler,25 where a husband asked for
a declaration that he was validly divorced, it was held to be proper for
his wife to counterclaim for a divorce. But in Zawadsky v. Zawadsky,26
where a husband sought a decision that no valid marriage had been con-
tracted, a counterclaim for separation was held improper as barred by
statute, although the court stated that the declaratory judgment act of
the state27 was "broad enough to permit matrimonial counterclaims in
actions which are not matrimonial in character." 2-8  Justice Pecora, in
Antrones v. Antrones, 29 refused to follow this decision. He admitted that
a declaratory action to have a marriage declared void was matrimonial in
nature but permitted the counterclaim to stand on the ground that the
"provisions for the interposition of counterclaims should be liberally
construed so that related issues may be determined in one action." '30
Emphasis on the point that the issues should be related is probably without
11 Ind. L. J. 376 (1936). An express repudiation of the holding in Brindley v.
Meara also appears in the case of Morris v. Ellis, 221 Wis. 307, 266 N. W. 921
(1936).
20 The court was probably concerned with the fact that any other holding would
be inconsistent with a constitutional requirement to the effect that there should
be but one form of civil action.
21 See Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Vince, 118 F. (2d) 232 (1941), cert. den.
314 U. S. 637, 62 S. Ct. 71, 86 L. Ed. 511 (1941) : United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Koch, 102 F. (2d) 288, 123 A. L. R. 279 (1939) ; Progressive Party v. Flynn,
400 Ill. 102, 79 N. E. (2d) 516 (1948).
22 344 Mo. 932, 130 S. W. (2d) 945, 125 A. L. R. 1149 (1939).
23 Such is also the view of Borchard, op. cit., pp. 237-40 and 439.
24 New York Civil Practice Act, § 1168. The statute was repealed in 1948.
25 170 Misc. 81, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 909 (1939).
26 169 Misc. 404, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 966 (1938).
27 New York Civil Practice Act, § 266.
28 169 Misc. 404 at 406, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 966 at 968.
29 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 241 (1945).
3058 N. Y. S. (2d) 241 at 243.
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significance in the more modern code states3 but, since the older codes
still require that the subject of the counterclaim be connected with the
subject of the action or arise out of the same transaction, 32 it is not sur-
prising to find a counterclaim in a declaratory judgment action failing
for non-compliance with these rules.33
Neither the Illinois Civil Practice Act nor the rules of the Supreme
Court contain any express provision indicating the propriety of the inter-
position of a coercive counterclaim in a declaratory judgment proceeding.
The section of declaratory judgments,34 adopted in 1945, is quite liberal
dnd was based primarily on the Michigan act 5 with significant additions
such as the one which authorizes the declaration of rights as an incident
to a counterclaim. 36 Subsection 3 thereof, providing for further relief, is
similar to a Kentucky statute37 as well as to the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act,38 but there has been no precise interpretation of the statute
on this point as yet.39
Most courts will permit a defendant, unwilling to have a declaratory
proceeding conducted as a friendly suit at the diplomatic level, to convert
the litigation into a regular legal battle with full belligerent status and
consequences. Under codes as liberal as the federal, the court may even
decide so to convert the character of the suit on its own motion in order
to assure a final adjudication of all the issues. The processes of change,
leading to uniformity in all types of actions, legal, equitable, or special
in origin, appear to be irreversible. It is regrettable that such should be
the case when the worthy objectives proposed by Professor Sunderland
are sacrificed along the way.
H. A. WoNER
3' Compare Danziger v. Peebler, 88 Cal. App. (2d) 314, 198 P. (2d) 719 (1948),
with Robertson v. Marcevich, 42 Cal. App. (2d) 610, 109 P. (2d) 708 (1941).
32 In general, see 47 Am. Jur., Set-off and Counterclaim, §§ 44 and 46.
33 Montgomery v. City and County of Denver, 102 Colo. 427, 80 P. (2d) 434
(1938).
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 181.1.
35 Mich. Comp. Laws 1929, § 13903 et seq.
36 A counterclaim for declaratory relief was filed to a declaratory action in the
case of Progressive Party v. Flynn, 400 Ill. 102, 79 N. E. (2d) 516 (1948).
37 Carrol's Ky. Code 1948, § 639(a) (1) et seq. Under this statute, in George v.
George, 238 Ky. 381, 141 S. W. (2d) 558 (1940), injunctive relief was granted
under a counterclaim to a declaratory action.
38 9 Unif. Laws Anno., Declaratory Judgment Act, pp. 213 and 252.
39 Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 335 Il. App. 106, 80 N. E. (2d) 548 (1948),
reversed on other grounds in 403 Ill. 260, 85 N. E. (2d) 722 (1949), comes closest
to the point but the issue was not argued therein. The case proceeded as a suit
for a declaration that an amendment to a corporate charter was valid. The de-
fendant, by counterclaim, sought payment of dividends allegedly due. There may be
a hint of criticism in the remark of the Appellate Court to the effect that the
record did not show "that the propriety of the summary judgment procedure was
questioned."
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MINES AND MINERALS--TERMINATION OF RIGHTS GRANTED----WHETHER
ABANDONMENT TERMINATES RIGHTS ACQUIRED UNDER MINING GRANT
CONTAINING PROVISION THAT GRANTEE SHALL HAVE MINE IN OPERATION
IN ONE YEAR OR DEED WrLL BE VoID--In the recent case of Midwest-
Radiant Corporation v. Hentze,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit was required to construe the effect of an instrument
by which the grantor conveyed and quit-claimed all her interest in the
coal underlying her farm in a down-state Illinois county in consideration
for one dollar and certain specified royalty payments. The instrument
provided that the grantee was to commence the sinking of a mine in six
months and to have it in operation in one year, or the deed would be void.
The grantee never entered upon or developed the property. Seven years
after the execution of the instrument, without taking action of any kind,
the grantor conveyed the farm to a third person and warranted title to
the entire fee. Thirty-five years later, the present owner of the farm
leased the same to the plaintiff under a mineral lease for the purpose of
mining coal thereon. Thereafter, the defendant procured a quit-claim deed
from the grantee in the initial mineral instrument and laid claim to the
coal. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that the
defendant had no right, title or interest in the coal, thereby raising an
issue as to whether the rights acquired by the grantee in the original
instrument were terminated by abandonment evidenced by his failure, for
forty years, to sink a mine or enter upon and develop the property. The
trial court entered judgment for the defendant, holding that the material
instrument was effective to convey an estate upon condition subsequent
which could not be lost merely by nonfulfillment of the condition sub-
sequent or by reason of abandonment. Plaintiff appealed, contending that
the instrument should have been construed as a mining lease or, even if
treated as a grant, the abandonment clause therein should have been
given effect. The Court of Appeals reversed in plaintiff's favor, holding
that, whether the instrument be construed as a mining lease or a grant,
the necessity for giving such a construction as would carry out the
manifest intention of the parties required that the instrument be treated
as one designed to convey an estate on condition precedent which had
never materialized by reason of abandonment.
No Illinois reviewing court has, as yet, passed upon the precise
question presented by the instant case, i.e. whether an instrument, similar
to the one in question and executed under like circumstances, is a deed
or merely a lease, together with the subsidiary question as to whether,
if construed as a grant, it should be held to create an estate on condition
1171 F. (2d) 635 (1948).
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precedent or on condition subsequent. Lacking state precedent, the federal
court was compelled to turn to a decision from another jurisdiction2 in
order to reach the result above set forth. It must be noted, however, that
such result is only persuasive authority so far as Illinois courts are
concerned,' the decision being no more than an indication of what the
federal court thinks the Illinois law on the subject should be. A review
of the decisions of courts of other jurisdictions upon the question, as well
as those Illinois decisions bearing upon related questions, is appropriate,
therefore, in order to determine the probable effect of the instant decision
upon Illinois law.
It has long been established that rights acquired under a mining
lease proper, given in consideration of royalties or a percentage of the
profits to be derived from development, may be lost by nonuser or
abandonment.4 In the instant case, however, the defendant relied on the
presence in the instrument of the words "convey and quit-claim,"
sufficient under Illinois law to convey a title,5 which title, according to
Uphoff v. Trustees of Tufts College6 and Jilek v. Chicago, Wilmington &
Franklin Coal Company,7 is ordinarily not lost by abandonment. In
those cases, it was held that where there has been a severance, by deed,
of title between the surface and the underlying minerals, mere nonuser
or abandonment by the grantee is not sufficient in and of itself to
terminate the mineral estate. However, as the court properly pointed
out, those cases are distinguishable from the instant case. Each involved
an absolute and present conveyance, completely closed at the time of the
transaction, without condition and based on a present consideration,
whereas the instrument before the court recited a nominal consideration
of one dollar, called for specified royalty payments, and contained an
express condition that development should be commenced within a specified
time. It shall be shown that the presence of these features, viewed
in the light of prevailing principles and precedents, made inevitable the
result achieved in the instant case.
The decisions in the Uphoff and Jilek cases are logical extensions
of the principle that, according to the common law, there can be no
divestiture of a vested legal title by abandonment unless the same results
2 Vandenbark v. Busiek, 126 F. (2d) 893 (1942).
3 See Rothschild & Co. v. Steger & Sons Piano Mfg. Co., 256 Il1. 196, 99 N. E. 920
(1912).
4 Brown v. Wilmore Coal Co., 153 F. 14'3 (1907) cert. den. 209 U. S. 546, 28 S. Ct.
758, 52 L. Ed. 920 (1908) ; McColl v. Bear Creek Coal Min. Co., 162 Iowa 491, 143
N. W. 532 (1913) ; Chandler v. French, 73 W. Va. 658, 81 S. E. 825 (1914).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 30, § 9.
6 351 Ill. 146, 184 N. E. 213 (1933).
7382 Ill. 241, 47 N. E. (2d) 96 (1943).
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from some form of estoppel or because of sufficient adverse possession
under a statute of limitation." In the application of that principle, it has
been held that a conveyance by deed of mineral rights or surface rights
alone creates two distinct estates in land9 and, where there has been
such a severance of the surface and the underlying minerals, mere posses-
sion of the surface is not possession of the minerals, hence occupancy of
the surface by the original owner, or those claiming under him, does not
cause the statute of limitation to run against the mineral owner.10 It has
also been held that deeds by the original owner, even those purporting
to convey the entire title, do not operate as adverse possession or notice
of an adverse claim."
The aforementioned principle is applicable, however, only in cases
where title has actually vested in the mineral owner. The result in the
instant case is grounded upon the determination of the court that title
never vested in the grantee under the instrument involved. The sinking
and operation of a mine within one year was held to be a condition
precedent, a dondition which has been defined as one which must happen
before an estate can vest or be enlarged.1 2  The condition precedent
being unfulfilled, no title vested in the grantee. As a result, there was
no basis for the application of the doctrine of the Uphoff and Jilek cases.
Undoubtedly, if the condition had been construed as a condition
subsequent, the rights acquired under the deed would not have been
terminated by the mere nonperformance thereof. Conditions subsequent
are such that, by their failure or nonperformance, an estate already
vested may be defeated," but the breach thereof does not per se produce
a reversion of the title. The estate continues in the grantee until some
proper step has been taken to consummate a forfeiture, such as a re-entry
or some other act that may be considered a lawful substitute therefor. 4
There must be some affirmative, positive act manifesting the intention to
this end,"5 and it has been held that the mere execution and recording of
a deed to a third person is not such an act.16
8 Tennessee Oil, Gas & Mineral Co. v. Brown, 131 F. 696 (1904), cert. den. 197
U. S. 621, 25 S. Ct. 798, 49 L. Ed. 910 (1905) ; Eastern Kentucky Mineral & T. Co.
v. Swann-Day L. Co., 148 Ky. 82, 146 S. W. 438 (1912).
9 Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 176 Ill. 275, 52 N. E. 144 (1898).
10 Brooke v. Dellinger, 193 Ga. 66, 17 S. E. (2d) 178 (1941) ; Franklin Fluorspar
Co. v. Hosick, 239 Ky. 454, 39 S. W. (2d) 665 (1931).
11 Renfro v. Hanon, 297 Ill. 353, 130 N. E. 740 (1921) ; Gill v. Fletcher, 74 Ohio
295, 78 N. E. 433 (1906).
12 Maguire v. City of Macomb, 293 Ill. 441, 127 N. E. 682 (1920).
13 Nowak v. Dombrowski, 267 Ill. 103, 107 N. E. 807 (1915).
14 Hart v. Lake, 273 Ill. 60, 112 N. E. 286 (1916).
15 Mercer-Lincoln Pine Knob Oil Co. v. Pruitt, 191 Ky. 207, 229, S. W. 374 (1921).
16Rannels v. Rowe, 145 F. 296 (1906), cert. den. 207 U. S. 591, 28 S. Ct. 257,
52 L. Ed. 355 (1907).
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It is often difficult to determine whether a condition is precedent or
subsequent for the same words may be employed to create each according
to the intention of the person creating the condition. 7 Consequently, it
has been affirmed as a general proposition that a decision on the question
of the nature of a condition depends not so much on artificial rules of
construction as it does on the application of good sense and sound equity
to the spirit of the instrument.'8 The instant decision, in holding that
the provision involved was a condition precedent, is a good illustration
of the application of that principle.
The court is not without support in its holding in the instant case
that, despite the presence in the instrument of words of conveyance, title
did not vest in the grantee. It has been held that the presence of words
of conveyance in a mineral deed is not sufficient to require a holding that
the effect thereof is to vest in the grantee title to the mineral interests in
the land.19 The courts strive to give effect to the ruling intention of the
parties, and in ascertaining that intention they closely scrutinize the real
consideration flowing to the grantor to determine whether he has retained
such a continuing interest in the premises as would be prejudiced by the
failure of the grantee to develop the mineral estate. Typical of the
prevailing view are the decisions in the cases of Tennessee Oil, Gas &
Mineral Company v. Brown2° and Eastern 'Kentucky Mineral & Timber
Company v. Swann-Day Lumber Campany.21 In those cases, the instru-
ments involved recited nominal considerations plus reservations of
continuing interests; in the form of royalties in the Brown case, but a
percentage of the profits that the grantee might realize in the Swan-Day
case. Both cases culminated in holdings that the rights of the grantees
were terminated by abandonment, the presence in the instruments of
words of conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding. In each case it was
decided that the nature of the real consideration moving to the grantor
required a holding that the instrument did not result in an out and out
conveyance in praesenti. The courts were of the opinion that to hold
otherwise would be to place upon the instruments highly unreasonable
constructions, directly opposed to the manifest intention of the parties.
Admittedly, the owner of land has a right to dispose of his interest
17 Burdis v. Burdis, 96 Va. 81, 30 S. E. 462 (1898).
is Phillips v. Gannon, 246 Ill. 98, 92 N. E. 616 (1910).
19 Crain v. Pure Oil Co., 25 F. (2d) 824 (1928).
20131 F. 696 (1904), cert. den. 197 U. S. 621, 25 S. Ct. 798, 49 L. Ed. 910 (190).
21 148 Ky. 82, 146 S. W. 438 (1912).
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therein for any valuable consideration he may choose to accept, 2 but the
prevailing view appears to be that the recital of a nominal consideration
coupled with the reservation of royalties or a percentage of profits
indicates that the real consideration inducing the conveyance is the
development of the property, 23 and, in the absence of any showing that
the true consideration is other than that appearing on the face of the
instrument, courts are reluctant to give such a construction to the
instrument as would place it absolutely in the power of the grantee to
hold the property for an indefinite period of time, or forever, without
ever attempting to pursue the essential purposes and objects of the
conveyance.2
4
It would appear that this attitude serves to safeguard both public
and private interests in the development of minerals, to the extent that
it discourages inactivity on the part of holders of mineral interests under
instruments similar to the one under consideration. The instant decision
is to be commended, therefore, not only because it is in harmony with
sound principles and precedents but also because of its salutary effect
upon the development of the state's natural resources.
A. N. HAMILTON
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES--UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-
WHETHER MEMBERS OP A PARTNERSHIP MAY CLAIM BENEFIT OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT AGAINST SUBPOENA TO PRODUCE PARTNERSHIP BOOKS AND
RECORD--A recent ruling of a federal district court sitting in California
dealt with the question as to whether the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment could be invoked by a partner against an alleged unreasonable search
of partnership papers.1 The Anti-Trust Division of the Department of
Justice had there caused a subpoena duces tecum to be issued to one of
the partners of a California partnership directing him to produce certain
specified records and communications for use as evidence in a criminal
prosecution against other members of the partnership. The other partners
appeared and moved to quash the subpoena as being in violation of their
22 See Franklin Fluorspar Co. v. Hosick, 239 Ky. 454, 39 S. W. (2d) 665 (1931),
holding that a mineral deed vested title in the grantee where the instrument re-
cited a consideration of "one dollar in hand paid" and no royalty or percentage of
profits was reserved.
23 See Paine v. Griffiths, 86 F. 452 (1898); Kentucky Rock Asphalt Co. v. Mil-
liner, 234 Ky. 217; 27 S. W. (2d) 937 (1930) ; Munsey v. Marnet Oil & Gas Co.,
113 Tex. 212, 254 S. W. 311 (1923).
24 See Crain v. Pure Oil Co., 25 F. (2d) 824 (1928); Hawkins v. Pepper, 117
N. C. 407, 23 S. E. 434 (1895).
1 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (1949).
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rights. The court granted the motion, holding that the subpoena was
violative of the movants' rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The ruling necessarily revolved around the nature and extent of the
protection afforded by the constitutional guaranty as interpreted by the
courts. It has been well established that compulsory production by an
individual of his private papers, under force of a subpoena duces tecum,
whether to be used against him in criminal proceedings or to effect a
forfeiture of his property, is an unreasonable search and seizure.2 The
doctrine has been also invoked for the protection of a corporation,3
although in a much more limited sense than is true of the absolute pro-
tection afforded the individual. A corporation may be required to pro-
duce its papers and records under a proper subpoena 4 because of a
difference in the nature of the relationship existing between an individual
and the state on the one hand and that of a corporation and the state
on the other. The corporation, being a creature of the state, is subject to
visitorial powers for, being limited to the specific powers granted, it owes
a duty to the state to open its doors to an investigation by the state
designed to determine whether the power conferred has been used or
abused. The human being owes no such duty to the state for he has
received nothing from it insofar as his powers to act are concerned, albeit
he does get protection in the exercise thereof. The right to require a
corporation to bring in its records is, nevertheless, subject to limitations
based upon reasonableness in the exercise thereof, so the subpoena must
be definite, must specify particular papers, and must be motivated by more
than a mere desire to find some violation of the law from a general perusal
of all corporate records and papers.5 In this limited sense, therefore,
corporations enjoy a measure of protection under the Fourth Amendment
but such protection is afforded to the corporation alone. It may not be
invoked by either an officer 6 or a stockholder,7 when ordered to produce
corporate papers, so as to serve as a personal privilege, for the right is a
2 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 24 S. Ct. 563, 48 L.
Ed. 860 (1903) ; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746
(1885).
3 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1905).
4 Coastwise Lumber & Supply Co. v. United States, 259 F. 849 (1919).
5 Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 44 S. Ct.
336, 68 L. Ed. 696 (1923); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S.
385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1919) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361,
31 S. Ct. 538, M L. Ed. 771 (1910) ; Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont,
207 U. S. 541, 28 S. Ct. 178, 52 L. Ed. 327 (1907).
6 Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S. 478, 33 S. Ct. 158, 57 L. Ed. 309 (1912)
American Lithographic Co. v. Werckmeister, 221 U. S. 603, 31 S. Ct. 676, 55 L.
Ed. 873 (1910) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 31 S. Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed.
771 (1910) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1905).
7 Grant v. United States, 227 U. S. 74, 33 S. Ct. 190, 57 L. Ed. 423 (1912).
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personal one and may be relied upon only by the person who is the owner
of the documents in question.8
A fairly logical extension of these doctrines has led to the conclusion
that a member of a labor union,9 or of any other voluntary association,1 °
stands in the same relative position as would an officer or a stockholder of
a corporation. Neither may refuse to produce the papers or records of
his organization under the direction of a lawful subpoena duces tecum for
organizations of this nature cannot be said to embody or represent the
purely private or personal interests of the individual members. Because
corporations" and other associations such as labor unions 12 and fraternal
organizations's have been regarded as entities, distinct and separate from
the officers, members, or stockholders thereof, it is quite apparent that
the former and not the latter are the only ones privileged with respect to
the papers and records of the organization.
The ruling in the instant case, considering the personal aspects of the
constitutional privilege in issue, necessarily demands an investigation into
the true nature of the status of a partnership, to ascertain whether it
should be regarded as a distinct entity or, as was the case at common law,
a contractual relationship incapable of existence independent of the indi-
viduals composing it.14 As California disclaims the entity theory of part-
nership, it was inevitable that the result reached in the instant case should
be to quash the subpoena as a violation of the rights of the individual
partner for ownership and possession of partnership property, in Cali-
fornia, is in the partners as co-owners and not in any entity.15
Considering the impact of this decision, however, while noting that it
is the first recorded case wherein the question of the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to partnership papers has been taken up, it should
not be concluded that the case establishes a general rule that the individual
members of all partnerships will be entitled to protection. Rather, it
extends a general test, in use since Hale v. Henkel,'6 to a partnership, i. e.
is the organization such that it may be regarded as an entity or not? A
8 United States v. Hoyt, 53 F. (2d) 881 (1931) ; United States v. Goss, 14 F. (2d)
229 (1926).
9 United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 64 S. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 1542 (1943).
10 Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795 (1920).
11 Guckenheimer v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 786 (1925).
12 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570, 66 L.
Ed. 975 (1921).
's United States v. Wainer, 49 F. (2d) 789 (1931).
14 47 C. J., Partnership, § 172, p. 747.
15 Cal. Civ. Code, § 2419. See also Park v. Union Mfg. Co., 159 Cal. 260, 114 P.
(2d) 373 (1941) ; People v. Maljan, 34 Cal. App. 384, 167 P. 547 (1917).
16201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1905).
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number of states have adopted the civil law concept of a societas under
which a juristic person is created separate and distinct from the member-
ship. 1 7 In these states,' 8 it would logically follow that the entity would be
the only one entitled to claim protection against an unreasonable search
and seizure of partnership papers. The majority of states, however,
including Illinois, 9 still adhere to the common law concept so, if the
instant case is followed, in such jurisdictions the individual partner might
bring partnership papers under the shield of the Fourth Amendment.
F. WOOD
17 40 C. J., Modern Civil Law, § 196, p. 1407.
18 The states involved are Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Carolina, as indicated by judicial decisions
therefrom as follows: Floyd & Lee v. Boyd, 16 Ga. 34, 84 S. E. 494 (1915);
Fenner & Beane v. Nelson, 64 Ga. App. 600, 13 S. E. (2d) 694 (1941); Soursos
v. Mason City, 230 Iowa 157, 296 N. W. 807 (1941); Toelke v. Toelke, 153 La.
697, 96 So. 536 (1923) ; Lebato v. Paulino, 304 Mich. 668, 8 N. W. (2d) 873 (1943) ;
In re Zent's Estate, 148 Neb. 104, 26 N. W. (2d) 793 (1947) ; Finston v. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission, 132 N. J. L. 276, 39 A. (2d) 697 (1944) ; Anderson
v. Dukes, 193 Okla. 395, 143 P. (2d) 800 (1943); Leadbetter v. Price, 102 Ore.
47. 201 P. 428 (1921) ; Chitwood v. McMillan, 189 S. C. 262, 1 S. E. (2d) 162
(1939).
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 106 , § 25. As to co-ownership of partnership prop-
erty, see Lindley v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 506, 56 N. E. (2d) 71 (1944) ; Lueth v.
Goodknecht, 345 Ill. 197, 177 N. E. 690 (1931). The case of Abbott v. Anderson,
265 Ill. 285, 106 N. E. 782 (1914), denies the existence of a separate partnership
entity so far as the Illinois partnership is concerned.
